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Abstract
In current interaction design research there is a widespread belief that situated action
and embodied interaction should replace mental representations in the theoretical
account of human cognition. This exclusion of representation is however diagnosed
as a sign of representation-phobia by Anderson (2003) who claims that it is
misguided. This paper aims to show why and how it can be overcome. Initially, a
literature review will show how representation-phobia manifests itself through two
different versions in HCI research. On the basis of this I argue that representationphobia leads to a theoretical dead end. Then, by drawing on semiotics and recent
findings from cognitive research, I argue that we cannot understand the rich
complexity of embodied interaction unless we furnish our thinking with a dynamic
notion of representation.
Keywords: cognition, embodied interaction, representation, experiential knowledge,
semiotics
In interaction design research, the two notions of “embodied interaction” and
“situated action” are thought to be useful for understanding how to design interactive
artifacts or environments that resonate with the rich complexity of our bodily and
everyday interaction with the material world (Dourish, 2004; see e.g. Hornecker,
2005; Klemmer, Hartmann, & Takayama, 2006).
Despite their divergent foci of interests, proponents of embodied interaction and
situated action generally share the view that cognition is not an internal affair in the
head of the user, but something that is shaped and evolves through our actions as
we react to real-time requirements from mundane settings. Further, in much recent
work, the increased focus on action and bodily experience is coupled with skepticism
towards the role of mental representations (Rowlands, 2009, p. 127). In fact, the
adjectives “embodied” and “situated” are sometimes used as synonyms for the idea
that cognition unfolds in a direct manner without the intervention of mental
representations and that HCI would therefore be better off if is simply deleted the
concept of representation from its terminological vocabulary. For this reason,
embodied interaction and activity theorists often see their frameworks as being
diametrically opposed to traditional HCI and classical cognitivism.
However, as Anderson has warned us, the just critique of traditional HCI’s notion of
representation should not lead to a “representation-phobia” in interaction design
research. Thus, according to Anderson, it is a mistake to exclude representations
from frameworks of embodied interaction. What embodied interaction is essentially
about is a re-thinking, rather than a rejection of representations (Hutchins, 2005;
Rowlands, 2006, 2009; Sinha, 2005; Zlatev, 2005)
Interestingly, a similar warning is echoed in Suchman (2007) who is careful to
underline, in the recently republished edition of Plans and situated action, that the
supplanting of mental representations with action is a theoretical dead end. True, the
nature and foundation of mental representations must be re-conceptualized, but
embodied and situated cognition relies essentially on a subtle interweaving between
action and mental representation.
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The aim of this paper is above all to cure interaction design theory of its
representation-phobia by showing that, contrary to what is being claimed, mental
representations do in fact play a foundational role in user experience – even at the
most basic levels of tangible and physical interaction. To set the scene, I begin with a
literature review focusing on two different forms of representation-phobia and the
common cause of their outbreak. First there is representation-phobia as it comes to
the fore in ideas of embodied interaction claiming that our abstract reasoning and
making sense of the world is primarily made up from meaning structures the nature
of which is physical and spatial, not symbolic and representational. Second, there is
representation-phobia as found in activity theory where it is reflected in the belief that
mental representations are too static and inflexible for coping with the ever changing
and ill-structured nature of everyday situations (for exceptions see Bærentsen &
Trettvik, 2002).
Having identified the key characteristics of representation-phobia, I will draw on
semiotics and findings from recent cognitive research in order to show why it must be
abandoned. More specifically, I will argue that the discovery of canonical neurons
show that representations are present at the most basic level of embodied
interaction. This presupposes of course a well-defined notion of what a
representation is. Therefore, I will provide such a notion together with a stratified
model showing how low-level representations grow into more sophisticated symbolic
forms. To improve the understandability of my argument, I will provide as many
examples as possible throughout the paper.

1. Literature review: Representation-phobia in theories of
embodied interaction and situated action
Since its early conception in the 1950s, research into the design of Human-Computer
Interaction (HCI) has been a cross-disciplinary scientific enterprise encompassing
computer science, cognitive psychology and Artificial Intelligence (AI). Out of this
original core of HCI-disciplines various theories of the human mind and cognition
have been developed over the years in order to understand how to design humancomputer interaction in harmony with principles of human thinking and experience
(see e.g. Carroll, 1987, 1991).
As is well known, theories of situated cognition and embodied interaction have been
developed because of an increasing dissatisfaction with the once so dominant
symbol system approach to cognition. According to this approach, which was
originally founded by Newell and Simon (Newell, 1980; Newell & Simon, 1972)
cognition basically consists in the algorithmic manipulation of symbol structures.
Through the work of Newell and Simon’s successors these symbol structures have
become known in HCI literature as goal-oriented plans, scripts (1977) frames (1975)
and mental models (Norman, 1988; Payne, 2003). Generally speaking, these
concepts refer to the idea that we use stereotypical background knowledge as
structures for comprehending events and objects reoccurring in everyday life. The
basic assumption is that these knowledge representations are built in as part of a
prior knowledge base in long-term memory, which we can recruit from for the
purpose of planning and executing action relevant in a given situation. For instance,
according to Schank & Abelson (1977) we presumably possess a RESTAURANT script
representing background knowledge for a sequence of actions relevant to perform
when visiting a such a place, namely entering >> get seated >> ordering >> eating
>> paying >> exiting.
There are two main objections that have been raised against the notion of such inner
symbols. First, it is claimed that symbolic knowledge representations are unable to
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account for how we handle problems and execute actions in everyday settings.
Because representations, under the symbolic view, are algorithmic and presuppose
pre-existing and static knowledge structures, while everyday situations, so the
argument goes, are unbound and ill structured and therefore not compatible with this
format (Winograd & Flores, 1986). Central for the consolidation of this objection was
the work of Suchman (1987) who convincingly argued for the role played by the
resources of the immediate situation in shaping human action. People are
improvisatory and employ ad hoc rules for reasoning instead of abstract algorithmic
rules for decision-making and inferences (Kaptelinin & Nardi, 2006, p. 16).
The second objection is that the symbol system approach completely ignores the role
of the body for our understanding and making sense of the world. According to
Newell and Simon inner symbols are “substrate neutral” in the sense that the nature
of our bodies and perceptual apparatus is regarded as irrelevant for the constitution
and structuring of their content. This is evidenced by a passage in Human Problem
Solving, where Newell and Simon overly admit that they have omitted both low-level
“sensory and motor skills, and many aspects of perception” from their study of
symbols, because they do not consider these factors central for the constitution of
symbolic activity (Newell & Simon, 1972, p. 8). However, as the proponents of the
embodied mind paradigm have convincingly argued, we cannot understand human
thinking and reasoning unless we take structures derived from our perceptual and
bodily interaction with the physical world into account (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987;
Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991).
Situated Action and Embodied Interaction are two conceptual frameworks that were
introduced in HCI during the late 1980s and 1990s in order to compensate for the
theoretical shortcomings of traditional HCI. While situated action is essentially about
trying to understand how to design technological systems based on the principles of
our online cognitive activity in the world (see e.g. Kaptelinin & Nardi, 2006; Nardi,
1996; Suchman, 1987; Wilson & Clark, 2005; Winograd & Flores, 1986), embodied
interaction is a design theory focusing on how to design intuitive, tangible, graspable
and direct physical interaction with technology (Dourish, 2004; Ehn & Linde, 2004;
Hornecker, 2005; Hurtienne & Israel, 2007; Lund, 2003; Lund & Waterworth, 1998).
What these two approaches have in common, despite their many profound
differences and divergent foci of interests, is a widespread distrust of the concept of
internal symbols or any sign of mental knowledge representations. In fact, the
adjectives of “situated” and “embodied” are often meant to put emphasis on the
assumption that cognition unfolds in a direct and distributed manner and that humancomputer interaction should therefore be conceived of as being non-symbolical.
For instance, AI-researcher and roboticist Rodney Brooks goes as far as to deny
internal symbols any existence in his account of embodied cognition, and he claims
that this insight is a prerequisite for building human-like intelligence successfully into
robotic devices (Brooks, 1999).
In a similar vein, Tangible and Embodied Interaction is promoted as a subfield of
interaction design that sees non-symbolic spatial and physical structures derived
from sensori-motor experience as predetermining how people understand and make
sense of the material world (Hurtienne & Israel, 2007). Under this view, Lund and
Waterworth (1998), for instance, define embodied interaction as aiming towards
building spatial structures into interfaces rather than seeking to communicate mental
models (as suggested by Norman, 1988).
However, some proponents of embodied interaction are not convinced that ascribing
primacy to spatial structures over symbolic representations is a tenable strategy.
Dourish defines embodied interaction as a design research program that deals with
the relationship between bodily and physical interaction on the one hand, and a
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symbolic realm on the other hand. Further, in his insightful field guide to Embodied
Cognition (EC), Anderson (2003, p. 100) posits that:

	
  
it is a vice too often indulged by scientists working in EC to make the absence of
representations a touchstone of virtue in design, and to therefore suppose, just
as do the creatures they devise in the lab, so too must humans display an
intelligence without representation. Representation-phobia is a distracting and
ultimately inessential rhetorical flourish plastered over a deep and powerful
argument. For rather than targeting representation per se, the central argument
of EC instead strikes at their nature and foundation.

Anderson argues convincingly that the conclusion to be arrived at is not that the
symbolic representations of traditional HCI ought to be given up altogether, but rather
that we must find ways to systematically relate the symbols and rules of abstract
reasoning to the more evolutionary primitive mechanisms which control perception
and action. If it can be shown that symbolic representations are at play in the
cognitive processing involved in bodily and perceptual experience, then the
representation-phobia of embodied interaction must be abandoned.
To expel representation-phobia from situated cognition requires a slightly different
therapy. More specifically, it must be shown that representations play a genuine role
in online cognitive activity and for the realization of actions. Interestingly, it is worth
noticing that in the recently republished edition of Plans and Situated Actions,
Suchman (2007) actually asserts that viewing her situated cognition framework as
non-representational would be a gross misinterpretation of her original argument. In
her book, she did not wish to deny the existence of plans conceived of as mentally
projected representations of courses of future action. Rather, in 1987, when the book
was originally published, Suchman wanted to point towards the critical and, at that
time, largely overlooked role played by the immediate context as actions are realized,
that is, how real-time requirements and unexpected changes in the context usually
call for a continuous revision and modification of the mentally projected plans. Thus,
Suchman sums up that her emphasize “is both on the utility of projecting future
actions and the reliance of those projections on a further horizon of activity that they
do not exhaustively specify” (Suchman, 2007, p. 19). And further on:
My position then and now has been that plans are conceptual and rhetorical
devices […] that are deeply consequential for the lived activities of those of us
who organize our actions in their terms. Just how plans are consequential for the
actions they project defined, at least potentially, a territory of mutual interest for
the social and cognitive sciences. (Suchman, 2007, p. 20)

	
  
Try to compare Suchman’s theoretical afterthoughts with the following description
taken from a special issue of the journal Cognitive Science, where Vera and Simon
(1993, p. 10) defend the symbol system approach against the claim that it is
incapable of relating inner symbols to actions in everyday settings:

	
  

	
  

Symbol systems can be (and sometimes are) used to store in memory
representations of external stimuli. They can manipulate these representations
as one way of planning actions, and can then execute these actions to change
the external situation. Of course, the internal representation of a real scene will
be highly incomplete and may be inaccurate, with the result that the actions may
or may not have their desired consequences.

Ignoring the fact that the term “system” would undoubtedly be foreign to Suchman’s
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vocabulary, we might say that for Suchman as well as for Vera and Simon, the
projection of plans and the execution of actions constitute an open-ended feedback
loop between a context, a conceptual system and a sensori-motor system. Hence,
the situated action approach should not, as Suchman is careful to underline, be seen
as antithetical to the symbolic approach. On the contrary, the two approaches would
ideally be able to complement each other in productive ways.
Admittedly, as almost everybody else, Suchman has reservations concerning the
narrow algorithmic definition of plans defended by Simon (Newell & Simon, 1972;
Simon, 1969). But if the notions of plans and mental representation, as found in the
symbolic approach, are broadened so as to include a more dynamic, flexible and
situated understanding of the interplay between mental representations and real-time
interaction, then a representational view of online cognition might even enrich the SA
account of this interplay. This however would require a re-conceptualization of
fundamental ideas and concepts belonging to the symbolic approach. The question
is of course whether such a re-conceptualization exists? If it can be shown that it
does, then the representation-phobia haunting much current work in situated action
would seem unjustified.

2. Levels of mental representation
In this section I aim to show that mental representations permeate our perceptual
and bodily interaction with physical objects. This presupposes of course that one has
a more elaborate notion of what a representation is.
Taken in its most basic sense, a representation involves a sign that stands for
something else in a real or imaginary world to the individual. Note that a
representation thus consists of a relationship between three elements: world, sign
and an agent. Smoke rising in the air stands for fire, but not in itself. It relies on the
interpretive work of the perceiver. Just as traces in the forest standing for the feet of
an animal or lines and figures on a picture plane standing for the naked body of the
model.
Theories of representation in design research have often been criticized for naively
believing that representations acquire their meaning from the things or events in
reality that they refer to (cf. Krippendorff, 1992). But this criticism seems to have
confused “reference” with “representation”. In semiotics, the term ‘reference’ is
generally used to designate the relationship between a sign and its referent, while
representation is seen as the activity of knowledge-making which the use of signs
allows humans to carry out (Nöth, 2000, pp. 148-9). Representations are not mere
copies or faded reflections of reality; they involve an active and deliberate use of
signs motivated by the individual’s egocentric purposes and cognitive abilities. This is
a key insight in the semiotics of Charles S. Peirce (Peirce, 1932). What makes
Peirce’s semiotic project seem highly relevant even today is that he anticipates the
idea in cognitive science that representation is the most central explanatory device
for human cognition (Apel, 1981; Innis, 1994).
When applying the notion of representation to human cognition, we are postulating
that mental states somehow act as representations. In cognitive science, it is
common, as Cummins (1989) has shown, to distinguish between four different forms
of mental representation. Mental representation may thus refer to (1) neurophysiological states, (2) perceptual content, (3) mental concepts; and (4) more
complex symbolic structures, which can take the form of mental models, frames or
scripts.
The revolt against representations in embodied interaction hinges upon the idea that
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human thinking emerges primarily from sensori-motor interaction between an
organism and its environment and that representation play no role at all at this level
(Johnson & Lakoff, 2002, pp. 249-50). But what if neuro-physiological states in the
sensori-motor brain actually show signs of representation themselves? Indeed, the
recent discovery of canonical neurons asks us to consider this possibility.

2.1 Sensori-M otor Representations
Canonical neurons are neurons in the pre-motor area of the monkey brain (F5) that
are activated when monkeys engage in action execution. In an experiment
conducted by Murata et al. (1997), it was shown that canonical neurons that become
activated when monkeys physically grasp an object also become active upon the
mere observation of the object. Later studies have indicated that similar mechanisms
exist in the human brain. This has been taken as evidence for the idea that canonical
neurons are crucial for our ability to recognize object affordances: “when a threedimensional object is seen, the F5 motor neurons for the actions it affords are
activated“ (Sahin & Erdogan, 2009).
What is interesting about this study is that it points toward the centrality of
representations in the sensori-motor system. If canonical neurons fire upon the mere
sight of an object, then it means that, on a neuro-physiological level, they inform the
organism about a possible future action that can be performed with this object. They
do not refer to the object as such, but help to select one functional value of the object
that might be relevant for the organism-environment interaction. In this sense,
canonical neurons seem to be a good candidate for a neuro-physiological state that
acts as a representation as shown in Fig. 1:
graspable

object affordance

apple

neuro-physiological states

Fig. 1 The representational structure of object affordances

This is in line with Jeannerod (1994) who argues that these neurons are rough motor
representations encoded into our semantic knowledge about the object. These motor
representations contain initial plans for generating low-level kinesthetic operations
presupposed by the execution of an action, for instance grasping, holding, throwing,
and so forth. It is important to note that the motor neurons represent a type of action
and not the bodily operations themselves. This means that if we see a red apple, we
may recognize immediately – thanks to the neurons – that it is graspable. But these
motor representations evoked from this perception say nothing about whether we
should use our left or right hand for carrying out this action.

2.2. Affordances as representation
The discovery of canonical neurons seems to run counter against the concept of
affordance, as it was originally introduced in Gibson’s ecological theory of perception
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(Gibson, 1977). According to Gibson, affordances are possibilities for action that we
simply pick up at a pre-reflective level of awareness. As such affordances are
thought to be perceived directly without the interference of mental representations or
higher-order cognitive operations of any kind. However, Rowlands (2006) has argued
that we need to take a refreshing new look at this assumption, because it rests upon
a too narrow view of the forms representations may take.
According to Rowlands, there are three kinds of actions that we need to be able to
distinguish from each other: actions, deeds and doings. An action is inextricably bound up
with our intentions such as our volitions, motives or belief-desire couplings. Deeds
are defined as pre-intentional acts that depend on the online, feedback-modulated
adjustments we perform during the course of interacting with the environment; and
doings are sub-intentional acts that are not performed for any reason. Let me try to
explain this in more detail.
Actions are performed for some reason in order to accomplish a goal or realize a
state of affair that will satisfy our intentions. In philosophy, there is a strict concept of
action that holds that the status and identity of an action can only be defined in terms
of an antecedent intention (Rowlands, 2006, pp. 96-7). For instance, I may whistle a
melody while, at the same time, tap my foot on the floor. Are there one or two actions
involved here? According to the strict concept of action this can be determined by
asking what intentional states I am the subject of. If I am the subject of a single
intentional state then there is only one action. Thus, if my intention is to tap my foot
while whistling (for instance as a way to keep the beat), then the corresponding
action is one rather than two. If, on the other hand, I am trying to tap my foot and
trying to whistle, which just happens to be synchronous, then according to this view I
would be performing two actions instead of one (cf. Rowlands, 2006, p. 96).
By reaching out for a goal or state of affair in the near future an intention clearly
bears the mark of a representation as it has traditionally been defined. More
specifically, an intention can be seen as a plan that is projected imaginatively
(however short-lived) and that contains motor representations for how this plan could
be fulfilled .
It is important not to confuse these motor representations with the motor
representations that have been discovered to be at work at the level of canonical
neurons. Compared to intentional states, canonical neurons are intimately bound up
with their connection to the physical environment and the perceptual acts we perform
in order to cope with our surroundings. Their firing depends utterly on the directness
and presence of objects and information available from the environment. Suppose
my sister gets angry with me and wants to throw an object at me. She may quickly
scan the room visually for objects with the functional value of being throwable. In this
scanning process canonical neurons may fire upon the sight of an apple, a tennis
ball, or a pencil, but not on her viewing the teak dining table in the corner or the car
parked outside the window. This means that the canonical neurons are activated
because of an action potential evoked from my sisters perceiving of the first three
items. Since throwable is indicated from her perception of very different phenomena,
it cannot be reduced to some physical properties. Rather it is dependent on the
relationship between the surface of the object and the visuo-motor operations of the
perceiver. In this sense throwable counts as an affordance. However, since
throwable can also be applied to various different phenomena, it must have a certain
type-like quality about it. Hence, it also qualifies as a representation.
According to Rowlands many of the acts we perform in order to exploit and
manipulate object affordances are not anticipated by any intentional states in the
strict sense. Suppose I have noticed the intention of my sister and I therefore start
running to escape her attack. In a second or so, she must pick up a throwable object,
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before I run out of the door. She immediately grasps the pencil and throws it at me.
Less than a second is not sufficient to form the intention of whether she should pick
up the pencil by grapping it with her whole hand or if grasping it between her thumb
and index finger gives a better hold. “In such situations we simply find ourselves
acting” (Rowlands, 2006, p. 104). Since these acts cannot be determined with
reference to an antecedent intentional state, they are not actions taken in the strict
sense. Rather they are what Rowlands calls “deeds”. Deeds are pre-intentional,
meaning that even though they are performed in order to fulfill a goal, they cannot be
accounted for in terms of intentions. However, they are not reducible either to mere
bodily movements, since we do perform them for a reason.
This is what distinguishes deeds from doings. Doings are sub-intentional acts we
perform without any reason. If you start attending to your bodily limbs and organs
you’ll notice that almost every part of you are in motion: your tongue, toes, eyes, and
so forth. We simply cannot help performing these micro-sensational acts or doings to
use the term suggested by Rowlands.
By using Rowlands’ three categories, it has been possible to differentiate between
representations at the level of actions and representations at the level of deeds, that
is the online feedback-modulated adjustments we perform in order to handle
everyday situations. These representations are to a very large extent detected by
canonical neurons in the flow of our interaction with the physical environment.
However, while canonical neurons may inform us about the type-like actions
potentials of visible objects – for instance that an apple is graspable – another
question that seems relevant to ask is whether we also know from the canonical
neurons that the apple is tasty and juicy inside? (cf. Eco, 2000) This seems highly
unlikely. The background knowledge we use for inferring such gustative qualities
from the apple depends rather on knowledge acquired through our previous
experiences of objects of the same kind. If you have never eaten an apple before,
you wouldn’t now what to expect. This implies that we draw on prototypical
conceptual representations of objects stored in our memory in order to project plans
for more complex embodied interactions with the objects at hand. These
representations are involved in the forming of intentional states and in the next
sections I will briefly account for these representations in terms of concepts,
perceptual judgments and mental frames.

2.3 M ental Concepts
It is generally assumed in cognitive science that we use mental constructs of the kind
that is usually referred to as ‘mental concepts’. Thus we have concepts for almost
everything in this world: apples, stones, the sun, God, shopping malls, and so on.
When we encounter things and events, we not only use mental concepts for
determining the nature of objects. We also employ them for making what is known as
perceptual judgments and for performing more abstract forms of reasoning.
According to Eco (2000, p. 63) a perceptual judgment is a hypothetical inference
based on object affordances and other perceptual inputs that we set up in working
memory for purposes of local understanding. Some examples of perceptual
judgments would be: “This X is an apple” or “Apples are juicy inside”. Or “This X in
front of me is a stone”, “It is struck by sun light”, and “it is hot” . We may even
construct more complex propositional representations out of these perceptual
judgments, for instance, if we manage to reach the conclusion that “The sun heats
the stone”. In this instance we subsume a particular relationship between two entities
in the world under the general law of Cause-Effect.
Interestingly, Johnson (1987, pp. 37-40) has argued that such logical inference
patterns like Cause-Effect, the Law of the Excluded Middle and the Law of
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Transitivity, which we normally see as part of abstract symbolic reasoning, have their
intuitive basis in our daily experiences with physical objects and orientation in space.
The idea then is that symbolic reasoning is constrained and, to some extent, made
up from structures derived from sensori-motor interaction between the organism and
its environment (this idea is accurately captured in the so-called Spatialization of
Form Hypothesis, see Lakoff 1987, p. 283). While Johnson who is an esteemed
philosopher argues convincingly for this idea, the truth of his claims has in fact not
only been anticipated, but also demonstrated by the experimental phenomenologist
Albert Michotte. Through a series of empirical experiments Michotte found that our
immediate sensory experience consists not only of objects or entities, but also their
causal relations (see e.g. Michotte, 1963). For example, in one of his studies
Michotte proved that the duration of contacts between two colliding objects is crucial
for how we understand their causal relation. This study is nicely summarized by Heft
(2003, p. 167):
If an object “makes contact” with another, and then ceases moving just as the
second object begins to move along the same prior trajectory, observers report
that the first object “launched” the second. However, when the first object even
after contact continues to move along the trajectory with the now-moving second
object, observers report a pushing or a chasing (“entraining”) rather than a
launching effect.	
  

Michotte’s study shows that spatio-temporal relations among objects that we
experience might lead to our perception of different types of causal effects. A result
like this challenges the influencing assumption that was introduced by Hume, namely
that entities in sensory experience are disjoint and that the order and lawfulness,
they appear to have, are the result of reflective operations on the part of the subject
that subsume sensory tokens under a priori logical principles of the intellect (an idea
that reached its culmination in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason). What Michotte’s
experiments reveal is that some causal effects are not the result of reflective
intellectual judgments, but of pre-reflective perceptual judgments.
However, in order to provide an adequate account of human cognition, we need to
move beyond the level of perceptual judgment toward inferences and mental
representations of an increasing complexity. There is clearly a difference between
perceiving one ball as having a launching effect on a second ball and the causal
relations that may be involved, for instance, in the planning of a trip to Montreal. Eco
(2000) has suggested that we conceived of inferences as semiotic processes that
work their way up from the level of sensory experience to higher-order mental
representations as a kind of scaffolding process. Like a cognitive spiral where lowlevel meaning structures develop into ever more complex mental representations.
For instance, according to this model object affordances are integrated as part of the
perceptual image of 3-dimensional objects; this perceptual content can then
integrated as part of perceptual judgments or be subsumed under mental concepts,
when, for instance, we identify this X as a species belonging to this category.
Further, mental concepts can be integrated as part of more advanced symbolic forms
such as mental models, frames and scripts. If we take an apple as our example this
scaffolding process can be diagramed as in Fig. 2:
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apple as objects in a grocery store

mental frames

apples are juicy inside

concepptual representations

mental concept

this is an apple

perceptual judgment

mental image

graspable

perception-action

object affordance

apple

neuro-physiological states

	
  
	
  

Fig. 2 Diagram of how higher-order cognition relates to the mechanism controlling perception and action.

The interconnected triangular structure of Fig. 2 illustrates how representations from
low-level cognition grow into more complex knowledge representations. The next two
sections will explain the nature of these representations.
2.4 M ental Fram es
Apart from perceptual judgments, mental concepts are also important for building up
even more complex networks of conceptual representations. Among such networks
we find mental frames. Basically, a frame is conceived as referring to an organized
system of concepts representing stereotypical background knowledge that people
unconsciously draw upon when using language and thinking and acting in the world
(Kövecses, 2006, p. 69). Consider Fillmore’s (1982) so-called BUY frame (see Fig. 3).
The idea is that we would not be able to understand the meaning of the verb “buy”,
unless we automatically activate a mental frame that allows us to make default
assumptions about the situation that the verb can be used to describe. For example,
“buy” presuppose a buyer owing an amount of money, a seller that offers some
goods that the buyer wants to have, and so forth (cf. Ungerer & Schmid, 2006). Since
the frame thus represents intentional roles they are important for forming goaloriented plans.
buy
goods
seller

buyer
money

Fig. 3 Fillmore’s Buy Frame (adapted from Fillmore, 1977)

In Artificial Intelligence Minsky (1975) found the notion of frame valuable for
explaining people’s default knowledge about objects or events involved in routine
tasks and reoccurring situations in work places. In cognitive psychology and
cognitive linguistics it has also been shown that we use frames in our perception,
planning and memory for events (Coulson, 2001; see also Barsalou, 1992). In so
doing, we become able to create expectations and make predictions about the
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consequences of actions in a given context.
For example, I may have some friends coming over for dinner. To surprise them I
want to make a juicy apple pie. But I realize that I don’t have any apples at home, so
I go to the grocery store to get some. To fulfil this intention I must draw upon a rich
array of conceptual representations and knowledge structures. For instance, I need
to be able to distinguish certain sort of apples from others, so that I’ll get the right
ones for my pie. At the point where I have to pay for the apples, it might be assumed
that I draw unconsciously on a BUY frame in order act appropriately in this economic
transaction. Obviously, the structure and content of such a frame will be sensitive to
people’s socio-cultural learning and background. For instance, in the Southern parts
of Europe it is custom to bargain over the prize, while in the Scandinavian countries it
is not. Hence, the precise nature of the BUY frame must be assumed to vary slightly
from one cultural context to another.
However, while this is relatively uncontroversial, one of the main critiques of the
notion of frames is that it is unable to account for how people manage to cope with
changes in practices, unforeseen occurrences or novel situations that violate their
expectations. Being products of long-term memory, frames offer pre-existing and
default mental templates for thinking, not dynamic and flexible models adjustable to
the immediate context as actions are realized. This is one of the central objections
made by proponents of situated action and distributed cognition.
To many situated activity theorists, our everyday life seems most of all to resemble
river rafting. In river rafting it is impossible for the canoeist to act according to
abstract mental plans, because the violent stream, turbulence and protrusions, force
him constantly to improvise and act according to ad hoc rules in order to control and
keep the canoe in balance.
Everyday situations have their own turbulences and protrusions. Ethnographic field
studies of people’s shopping behaviour have been taken as evidence for this. When
people are going to put the items they have bought into a shopping bag, there are
typically a whole series of factors that might distract them from the purpose of their
actions. Items come down the line in the shopping mall in a random order, so it is a
challenge to us to decide what items should go in the bottom and which ones at the
top. Then, while we are in the midst of packing our bag, our mobile phone may start
ringing, or the cashier may interrupt the course of actions telling us that we haven’t
given him the exact amount of money. In such instances, it is unlikely that we rely on
an abstract representation or algorithm in the head telling us what to do. Or put more
accurately: perhaps there is such an algorithm but it is of no use, since unforeseen
occurrences and events constantly force us to deviate from such idealized mental
models. To explain how we nevertheless succeed most often in getting home without
finding splashed eggs in our shopping bag, it has been suggested that we use the
items themselves as external vehicles for informing us about weight and size and
whether they should be placed in the bottom and at the top. By externalizing
cognitive resources into the environment we are able to adjust to real-time
requirements (see e.g. Hutchins, 1995; Kirsh, 1995).
However, even though I agree that such situations undoubted question the universal
validity of abstract mental representations such as frames, they should not be taken
as a model for all forms of cognition (Rowlands 2006). Just as well-structured
intentional acts such as following a recipe or going to the grocery store should not be
taken as a model either. Moreover, even stressful situations do not prove that the
role traditionally assigned to representations can be completely taken over by actions
without representations. Spontaneous acts and improvisation that we may perform
during our shopping do not unfold beyond the representational. If so, they would be
reducible to mere doings, bodily movements that are performed without any reason.
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This is clearly not the case. We perform those acts spontaneously in order to
accomplish goals or satisfy our will. Hence, they are deeds that – as we have seen –
rely to a large extent on representations, however not of the kind that intentions are
made up from. Deeds stand halfway between doings and actions. They involve our
real-time coping with representations at the level of canonical neurons and direct
perception.

3. Conclusion
To sum up, in this paper I have argued that representations permeate our entire
existence from its most basic manifestation at a neuro-physiological level to
conceptual representations in people’s memory motivated by social-cultural learning
and practices. We must of course recognize that representations come in various
forms defined by increasing complexity (cf. Fig. 2).
If this idea is taken seriously, then we must reject the idea that the absence of
representation should be made a touchstone of virtue in design. Many
representation-phobic researchers either from the design or HCI community seem to
believe that embodied interaction is a design strategy for working primarily with
physical structures at the sensori-motor level. However, from a representational point
of view, physical structures can only be properly understood if they are seen as one
element in a triadic relationship between object, sign, and organism.
Taking my point of departure from Anderson (2003) and Suchman (2007) I initially
claimed that the central argument of embodied cognition and situated action consists
in a re-conceptualization rather than a rejection of representation. More specifically,
this re-conceptualization relies on one being able systematically to relate the symbols
and rules of abstract reasoning to more evolutionary primitive mechanisms, which
control perception and action (Anderson, 2003). In order to carry out this task I first
drew upon Rowlands’ (2006) distinction between actions, deeds and doings, which
allowed me to isolate representations at the level of intentions from representations
at the level of our pre-intentional perceptual interaction with the physical world, that is
deeds. The latter are adjustable to dynamic changes in the context. In this sense, it
seems as if deeds could have the potential of bridging a situated action perspective
with a representational perspective. This however needs to be studied more carefully
in a future work.
Furthermore, I have attempted to show how the ability to infer generality in terms of
laws and relations between objects in perception (such as Cause-Effect), which we
normally associate with abstract reasoning, in fact emerge from primitive
mechanisms in perception itself.
In order to provide the reader with a clearer view of the rich interplay that are at stake
from neuro-physiological states to abstract thinking, I have laid out a diagram in Fig.
2. Much of what has been said about the upper levels in this diagram is standard
knowledge in cognitive science. However, the idea of including these levels in the
diagram is of course that embodied interaction encompasses the whole continuum of
representations from canonical neurons to mental frames. It is this continuum that
accounts for the full complexity of embodied interaction.
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